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 Vision, Color Innateness, and 
Method in Newton’s Opticks
Philippe Hamou1
Inthis essay I argue for the centrality of Newton’s theory of vision to his account of 
light and color.Relying on psycho-physical experiments, anatomical observations, 
and physical hypotheses, Newton, quite early in his career, elaborated an original, 
although largely hypothetical,theory of vision, to which he remained faithful through-
out his life. The main assumptions of this theory, I urge,play an important (although 
almost entirely tacit) role in the demonstration of one of the most famous theses of 
the Opticks:  the thesis thatspectral colors are “innately” present in white solar light. 
The theory of vision is especially crucial to understanding the second ‘synthetic’ part 
of the demonstration, which deals with experiments showinghowwhite lightcan be 
artificially produced out of prismatic colors.This synthesis is not, as often conceived, 
a mere reversal of the analysis, brought in for pedagogical reasons, but, as I argue, an 
integral part of the Newtonian demonstration—and this makes its dependency on the 
theory of vision all the more striking. In the first two sections of this essay, I propose 
a reconstruction of the argument developed in Book I of the Opticks,and I show why 
and where a theory of vision is needed. In the third section, I go back to Newton’s 
early researches into the psycho-physiology of vision, in order to give a fuller presenta-
tion of Newton’s actual theory of vision and to show that this theory, even though it 
was developed independently of the prismatic experiments, was, in all its component 
parts,precisely the one needed for the demonstration of color innateness.
Prima facie, the centrality of visual theory for Newton’s theory of light and color 
may appear difficult to maintain. As its subtitle makes quite clear, Newton’s book is 
1 Université Lille III—UMR “Savoirs, textes, Langage”.The research for this chapter was 
undertaken under the auspices of Pneuma, an international research project funded by the 
Agencenationale de la Recherche (ANR-09-SSOC-056-1). The author wishes to express his 
warmest thanks to Zvi Biener, Eric Schliesser and Alan Shapiro for their lucid comments on the 
first stage of this essay.
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67 Vision, Color Innateness, and Method in Newton’s Opticks
not on vision, it is a “treatise on light and colors.”2 The theory of vision is dealt with 
in a rather cursory and peripheral way. Its geometrical part is granted a brief appear-
ance in the first pages, in axioms VII and VIII, where Newton gives an account of 
the way retinal images are formed in the eye through refraction, and describes the 
law thatdetermines the apparent locus of an object that is seen through reflection or 
refraction.3 Then, in the appendix of the treatise, the “Queries,” Newton devotes a 
few pages to a presentation of his own ideas on the physiology of vision (Queries 12 
to 16; plus, in the second English edition, Queries 17 and 23), but he does this in a 
hypothetical guise, thereby clearly implying that these speculations are not required 
for establishing the main points of the book concerning refraction and the nature of 
light and colors.4 Indeed, except for a couple of interesting but inconspicuous hints to 
which we shall soon return,the theory of vision is almost absent from the main text 
of the Opticks.
There are certainly goodmethodological reasons why Newton wanted to keep clear 
of the theory of vision when enquiring about light and color. One is related to the issue 
of certainty. Reenacting the experimentalist ban against hypotheses, Newton forcefully 
claimed that the new theory of light and colors was free from any kind of hypothesis, 
evinced entirely from phenomena and demonstrations. But, this clearly was not the 
case for the theory of vision, which requires some amount of hypothetical reasoning 
both for its physiological part (concerned with mechanisms occurring in the invisible 
tissues or fluids of the optical nerve) and for the still inchoate psychology of visual 
representation. The relegation of the theory of vision to the hypothetical Queries of the 
Opticks is a clear indication of this epistemic gap.
A second methodological point concerns order. The theory of light and color had 
to be considered prior to the theory of vision.The reason for thisis expressed with great 
clarity in an early note from Newton’s Cambridge Notebook, a notebook in which the 
study of vision, and especially its physiology and psychology, is a dominant theme:
The nature of things is more securely & naturally deduced from their operacions 
one upon another than upon our senses. And when by the former Experiments 
we have found the nature of bodys, by the latter wee may more clearely find 
the nature of our senses. But so long as wee are ignorant of the nature of both 
2 The full title is Opticks, or a Treatise of the Reflections, Refractions, Inflections and Colours 
of Light.
3 The law states that the apparent locus of an object seen through reflection or refraction is the 
place from which the rays diverge after their last reflection or refraction. On this law, and its 
sources in Johannes Kepler and Isaac Barrow, see Shapiro (1990).
4 On the methodological origins of the Newtonian “Queries,” see Anstey (2004).
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soule& body wee cannot clearely distinguish how far an act of sensation pro-
ceeds from the soule& how far from the body [etc.]5
It seems that this is a sort of caveat that Newton supplied in the course of his own 
study of vision, perhaps realizing that this study was to remain somewhat confused 
until a clear understanding of the nature of light and of how it affects (or is affected 
by) bodies in general could be obtained. It recommends an order of inquiry: first to 
study bodies and their operations one upon another (in order to discover what Locke 
would label “powers,” or tertiary qualities, which are in effect the principal objects of 
physical experimental science) and, then, to apply the knowledge obtained to the more 
composite science of the senses, which requires being able to distinguish and somehow 
subtract from the phenomena under consideration the bodily affection that is involved 
in the sensory interaction. In all essentials, this order of study is the one that Newton 
wanted to follow in the Opticks:  the experimental study of light, especially through 
prismatic experiments, permits a kind of third-person view on its physical effects, 
which serves as an empirical basis for demonstrating its nature, qualities, and powers 
independently of its sensory effects. Then, and only then, consequences are drawn for 
the construction of optical instruments, and queries are raised about possible implica-
tions for the theory of vision.
This postulated order, however, besides not being the actual, historical order of 
Newton’s inquiries, is not even matched in the systematic organization of Newton’s 
demonstrations in the text of the Opticks. This is the main point of the presentessay.
As we shall see, Newton’s thesis that white solar light is a mixture of colors depends 
upon on the theory of vision both heuristically—the theory of vision makes the thesis 
conceivable—and for its justification—the thesis rests on premises thatrequire impor-
tant inputs from the theory of vision. This in turn raises questions on the ambigu-
ous methodological nature of Newton’s Opticks, poised uneasily between proclaimed 
experimentalist ideals on the one hand, and a well-articulated, although hypothetical, 
natural philosophy on the other.
5 Newton (ms. a, 101v.). The manuscript notebook from the Cambridge University Library 
is titled Quaestionesquaedamphilosophiae, and it documents Newton’s thoughts and read-
ings between 1661 and 1665. Diplomatic text and a normalized version are provided at http://
www.newtonproject.sussex.ac.uk. The text is also transcribed in McGuire and Tamny (1983, 
p. 376–377). A large number of notes are concerned with optical questions, and especially with 
experiments on after-images, double vision, and other phenomena involving the physiology and 
psychology of vision. Another manuscript (Newton, ms. b) titled “Of colors” contains Newton’s 
first prismatic researches in a dark room, together with a hypothesis on the anatomy and func-
tioning of the optical nerves. McGuire and Tamny, as well as the editors of the “Newton Project” 
date it from 1665–1666, but H. Guerlac (1983) has argued that it might be of a later date, sug-
gesting 1668–1969.
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3.1 THE INTENT AND DEMONSTRATIVE 
STRUCTURE OF BOOK I OF THE OPTICKS
Book I of the Opticks comprises two parts, both left untitled. The first opens with a 
set of definitions and axioms, including the important definition of “simple, homo-
geneal and similar light” as the light “whose rays are all alike refrangible,” whereas 
“compound, heterogeneal and dissimilar light” is defined as “that whose rays are some 
more refrangible than others” (def. VII). The main body of this first part is princi-
pally concerned with establishing an experimental link between homogeneity thus 
construed, and homogeneity or similarity in color and reflexibility,6 showing that rays 
that are similar in refrangibility also agree in color and reflexibility. Newton shows 
experimentally that solar light is dispersed through refraction into colored rays, each 
of them possessing a specific refrangibility that is not changed through later successive 
refractions. This, according to Newton’s prior definitions, makes these spectral-colored 
rays homogeneous, whereas solar white light appears not to be so. To establish these 
points, Newton offers a set of experiments (prop.II, exp.3 to 8), most of them taken 
from his former Lectionesopticae. One of them, experiment 6, using two prisms in suc-
cession, is the famous experimentumcrucis of 1672, although it is no longer singled out 
or presented as “crucial.”7 It is now presented as one experiment among several others 
brought in to prove Newton’s main thesis: that white light is variously refrangible, and 
variety in refrangibility entails variety in color. A next set of experiments (exp. 9 and 
10; and prop. III) establishes a similar link between variety in refrangibility and variety 
in reflexibility. Finally, as in the 1672 paper, Newton draws important practical con-
sequences of chromatic dispersion for the improvement of telescopes (prop. VII and 
VIII). When refracted through a lens, rays of heterogeneous light (such as the solar or 
stellar rays) cannot be focused properly, on account of their different refrangibility. As 
a consequence, dioptrical telescopes are deemed to produce chromatic aberrations.
At this point (the end of Part 1), Newton has demonstrated a non-trivial relation 
between refrangibility, color, and reflexibility: they are qualities so tightly connected 
that the reader can extend the former definition of homogeneous light: rays of light, 
6 What Newton calls reflexibility is the “disposition” of the rays “to be reflected or turned back 
into the same medium from any other medium upon whose surface they fall” (Newton 1979, 
p. 3). Variety of reflexibility is shown in the phenomenon of total reflection when incident rays of 
light, passing out from glass to air, and being inclined more and more, begin to be reflected at the 
surface of the glass. The rays that are more refrangible are also the rays that are more reflexible 
(see Opticks, vol. 1, ch. 1, prop. 3; Newton 1979, p. 63).
7 On the much discussed interpretation of the experimentumcrucis, see especially Lohne (1968), 
Laymon (1978), Schaffer (1989), Shapiro (1996), Worrall (2000), and Zemplen and Demeter 
(2010); Stein (ms. a, ms. b).
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being ‘homogeneal,’ that are similar in terms of refrangibility are also similar, ‘homo-
geneal,’ in terms of color and reflexibility.
This is no small result. Yet Newton added a second part to this first because the 
point he wished to establish was much more ambitious:  it is in fact Newton’s grand 
thesis, the one for which his optical work is famous, but also the one most constantly 
contested by his opponents. It is the thesis in defense of which Newton had to revise 
and refine his argument throughout his career, with what is generally considered to 
be only a qualified success (at least as far as formal argumentation, rather than public 
agreement, is concerned).This thesis is that “Colours are not Qualification of Light, 
derived from Refractions or Reflections of natural Bodies (as ’tis generally believed,) 
but Original and Connate properties, which in divers Rays are divers.”8 This entails that 
“colors” are originally present in white solar light before refraction, even though they 
are not yet apparent to the eye.9 So refraction is not a process through which light is 
modified—but rather qualitatively changed, as if a foreign element, a shadow or dark-
ness, was introduced into a formerly pure white in order to produce colors. Colors are, 
so to speak, ‘substantially’ present in white solar light, and it should be understood 
that the prism is simply acting as a sieve or a filter thatseparates and manifests them.
There is no doubt that Newton strongly believed this to be true. Commentators 
have pointed outthat this belief was“buttressed by, or perhaps even derived from, his 
corpuscular view of light.”10 If one considers light as a compound of discrete particles, 
it is indeed easily conceivable that white light be a mixture, similar to the mixture 
of variously colored powders whose heterogeneity appears when viewed through a 
microscope. However, even though this corpuscular conviction was firmly rooted in 
his mind, Newton insists adamantly on the methodological commitment thatopens 
the Opticks: “not to explain the Properties of Light by hypotheses, but to propose and 
prove them by Reason and Experiments.”11
Newton always claimed that he has demonstrated his strong thesis according to 
the experimental method; that is, not from hypotheses on the invisible constitution of 
8 This is the “first proposition” of the 1672 New Theory of Light and Colours (Newton 1959–1977, 
vol. 1, p. 292).
9 Newton was well aware of this claim’s paradoxical character, as one can see from the following 
passage, deleted from the copy of the “Observations” sent to Oldenburg in 1675: “This [white 
being a mixture] I believe hath seemed the most paradoxicall of all my assertions, and met with 
the most universal and obstinate prejudice. But to me it appears as infaillibly true & certain, as 
it can seem extravagant to others. For hitherto I never tried any way to mix all colours by which 
I could not in some degree or other produce whiteness, and yet I have as many tryalls as I could 
excogitate ways of mixing colours . . . ” (Newton 1959–1977, vol. 1, p. 385).
10 See Shapiro (1980, p.  230). The present chapter owes much to the solid scholarship of 
Shapiro’s paper.
11 Newton (1979, p. 1).
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things, but as “a most rigid consequence [  . . . ] evinced by the mediation of experiments, 
concluding directly without any suspicion of doubt.”12 However, the rather stern oppo-
sition of his first readers, and in consequence, the successive rephrasing of the dem-
onstration, ending in the final text of the Opticks, indicate that this much-sought-after 
inductive proof somehow eluded Newton.13 In any case, the second part of Book Iof 
the Opticks may be considered as its final (re)formulation. But here, as well as in the 
other parts of the book, Newton does not give his reader an explicit statement of the 
logical structure of the proof—the demonstration is, so to speak, embedded in the 
experiments themselves, or rather in a tightly woven net of successive experiments.14
Newton began by establishing through experiments (prop. I, exp.  1 to 3)  that 
refracted colors are not affected by changes in the situation of the boundaries of shad-
ows and lights; he went on to show that colors once produced by refraction cannot 
be changed by further refractions or reflections. It seems clear that these two sets of 
experiments have a polemical intent (they helpdiscard commonly held misconcep-
tions regarding color production), but they also contribute, together with several 
experiments from the first part, toward the proof of the immutability of spectral colors 
after refraction.
Secondly, Newton presented a set of experiments on the composition of spectral 
colors, using lenses, which result in the production of variously colored light (prop.V, 
exp. 9 to 15). This allowed him to give an empirical rule for the determination of the 
compound color that may be obtained when mixing a given quantity of rays of two 
or more spectral colors (prop.VI). The fifth and main proposition of this second part 
states that white solar light is a mixture of all the spectral colors in due proportion. In 
fact white light, according to the aforementioned rule, may be produced in various 
ways, using only three or four colors in due proportions. The notion that the white or 
solar light is a rich mixture, requiring “all the primary colors,” is initially introduced in 
this fifth proposition without substantial justification. But Newton wanted to convince 
his reader that it is only the rich re-composed white, and not any simpler compound 
white, that is able to match the whole range of phenomenal properties manifested by 
solar light. The demonstration of this point is certainly the main purpose of the final 
12 Newton (1959–1977, vol. 1, p. 97).
13 On this long quest, see Shapiro (1980).
14 This certainly is one of the most original methodological features of the book—a feature to 
which its first readers were especially sensitive. See, for example, ‘s Gravesande’s judgment: “His 
experiments have a kind of connection one with another; and from one experiment he has often, 
with great Subtility, deduced what was to be tried next, so as to enable him to come nearer to 
the mark”(‘s Gravesande 1737, p. xv). A similar appreciation appears in Pierre Coste’s preface to 
the French translation of the Opticks. Newton’s work is described as “ un tissu merveilleux de 
raisonnemens solides fondezsur des Experiences toutes nouvelles” (Newton 1720, Preface, p. iii)
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propositions (prop VIII, IX, and X), where Newton showed how the new understand-
ing of white solar light as a rich mixture of color is adequate to explain all the appear-
ances of the different kinds of colors that may be seen in this world: not only the colors 
produced through prisms, but also the colors of the rainbow, as well as the permanent 
colors of natural bodies.15 In the two concluding pages of the Opticks, Newton pre-
sented this final part of Book I as an example of the synthetic procedure that“consists 
in assuming the causes discover’d and establish’d as Principles, and by them explaining 
the Phaenomena proceeding from them and proving the Explanation.”16 It is impor-
tant to see that this synthetic phase is not in the Opticks a mere reversal of the analytic 
procedure—an abstract reconstruction of the phenomena. The remarkable fact that 
white light can be artificially recomposed allows Newton to give a concrete dimension 
to the synthesis, to ground it on experiments, as can be seen in the final experiment of 
Book I, where artificial white light is created out of the complete recollection of all the 
spectral rays produced by a prism, and then tested against various colored bodies in 
order to compare its effects with the direct effects of true solar light.
In sum, the demonstrative structure of Book Iis as follows:it starts with an “analyti-
cal part,” progressing withwhere Newton shows that white light is variously refrangible, 
that similarity in refrangibility entails similarity in color and reflexibility, and finally 
that homogeneous colors produced by refraction are immutable, cannot be changed 
or dispersed by new refractions. Thisanalysis is followed by a synthesisthatshows that 
these homogeneous colors can be artificially recombined, in order to produce hetero-
geneous ones, and that a recombination of the whole set of spectral colors produces 
a white light whose behavior is in all essentials similar to the behavior of solar light. 
The conclusion of the whole demonstration (analysis plus synthesis) is the “grand” 
thesis:the innateness of spectral colors in white solar light.
3.2 VISUAL INGREDIENTS IN THE 
DEMONSTRATION OF COLOR INNATENESS
To prove the innateness of colors, Newton had to meet two distinct challenges. One is 
conceptual: to understand that colors are actually in white light without our being able 
to see them there, it seems that we need a new definition of color and color homoge-
neity that does not draw on phenomenal properties. Perceptually, or phenomenally, 
heterogeneous light rays always present themselves as homogeneously colored, and, 
15 An exception is made for the colors produced in the imagination by “the power of phantasy 
in a dream,” or in “a Mad-man seeing things before him which are not there,” or by striking or 
pressing the eyes . . . (Newton 1979, p. 161).
16 Newton (1979, Query 31, p. 405).
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Mon Feb 10 2014, NEWGEN
acprof-9780199337095.indd   72 2/10/2014   7:52:19 PM
73 Vision, Color Innateness, and Method in Newton’s Opticks
reciprocally, simple homogeneous colors are indistinguishable from compound, het-
erogeneous ones. For any sighted reader,it may seem somewhat of a paradox to say that 
certain colors are present in certain lights but remain unseen. The second challenge 
concerns the argument itself: Newton had to convince his readers that the immuta-
bility of the spectral rays after refraction argues for their innateness in the solar light 
before refraction. This was not a simple task. It might very well have been the case that 
“immutable” colors were created through refraction, rather than merely separated or 
made apparent. So what Newton had to find was a way to reverse the analysis, to show 
that if the effects (the colors) were not already in the cause (the solar light), they would 
be different: light would behave differently in some experimentally accessible way. As 
Newton was aware, the old “crucial experiment” was not fit for the task. As an argu-
ment for the innateness of color, it had insuperable weaknesses—among them the fact, 
often pointed out by Newton’s challengers, that it was almost impossible to obtain pure 
colors after the second refraction,17 a fact thatindeed could give the disastrous impres-
sion that refraction itself created the colors. It seems that in the Opticks, the task of 
proving the innateness of colors had now been taken up afresh and attempted in terms 
of composition experiments, that is, the ‘concrete’ synthesis that operates backward 
from the causes to the effects, from homogeneous colors to white light. Thus, as far as 
innateness of colors is concerned, this synthesis is not a mere confirmation of a propo-
sition that had already been fully proved in a purely analytical way. It is an integral and 
essential part of a two-sided, regressive demonstration, which needs to go from effects 
to causes and back, in order to be completed.
My contention is that the way back, the second synthetic part of the demonstra-
tion, is tightly connected with, and dependent on, hypothetical premises taken from 
Newton’s theory of vision. Discrete ingredients from the theory of vision are brought in 
twice in the text of the second part of Book I.The first mention occurs rather abruptly at the 
end of proposition II, where Newton proposes a revision of his former definition of “homo-
geneal light,”18 and introduces a dispositional definition of “homogeneal colors” in terms of 
powers “to stir up sensations.” The second mention (concerning how the human sensorium 
17 This particular issue was raised both by Mariotte and Lucas, when reporting their failed attempt 
to replicate the experiment. Laymon (1978) shows that Newton, after Lucas and Mariotte’s crit-
icisms, was forced to acknowledge that the (1672) description of the crucial experiment was 
somehow idealized. Answering his critics, Newton tried to minimize the difficulty, in arguing 
that the second, unwelcomed, dispersion observed after the light had passed through the second 
prism would disappear if the hole through which the colors are selected were small enough to let 
only one single color ray pass through. This was of course impossible in practice.
18 Compare to definitions VII and VIII (Newton 1979, p. 4) where Newton speaks of the “colours 
of homogenal lights” without mentioning the fact that the rays are not really colored, but only 
endowed with colorific properties.
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is supposed to react to quick successive visual stimuli) plays a central role in the explana-
tion of the tenth experiment (prop. V), a composition experiment using an oversized comb 
whose importance for the demonstration of innateness cannot be overrated. It appears that 
both the conceptual and the logical challenges are confronted in these two passages.
3.2.1 The Dispositional Definition of Color
According to the new definition of color given at the end of proposition II, a red homoge-
neal light is a light that makes the objects that reflect it, and itself, appear red—a ‘rubrifick’ 
or ‘red-making’ light:
The homogenaeal Light and Rays which appear red, or rather make the Objects 
appear so, I call Rubrifick or Red-making; those which make Objects appear yel-
low, green, blue, and violet, I call Yellow-making, Green-making, Violet-making, 
and so of the rest.
Newton then explains that if at times he speaks of rays as colored or endowed with color, 
he should be understood as speaking not philosophically:
For the Rays to speak properly are not coloured. In them there is nothing else 
than a certain Power or Disposition to stir up a certain Sensation of this or that 
Colour. For as Sound in a Bell or musical String or other sounding Body, is noth-
ing but that Motion propagated from the Object, and in the Sensorium ’tis a Sense 
of that motion under the Form of Sound; so Colours in the Object are nothing but 
a Disposition to reflect this or that Sort of Rays more copiously than the rest; in the 
Rays they are nothing but their disposition to propagate this or that Motion into 
the Sensorium, and in the Sensorium they are Sensations of those Motions under 
the Forms of Colours.”19
It’s tempting to hear here an echo of the famous doctrine of secondary qualities, a 
doctrine associated with Boyle and Locke whose central tenet was already present in 
Galileo or Descartes: colors, as well as sounds or tastes or smells are not to be counted 
among the true original qualities of bodies. Secondary qualities are in fact not real 
qualities of bodies at all, but “imputed”20 ones, falsely attributed to the body or to the 
19 Newton (1979, p. 124–125). On the topic of dispositions in Newton and his contemporaries, 
see Joy (2012).
20 See Locke (1975, Book II, viii. 22): “[  . . . ]those secondary and imputed qualities, which are 
but the powers of several combinations of those primary ones, when they operate without being 
distinctly discerned.”
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light that produces in us the sensation of such or such color, sound, etc. They would not 
exist if there were no sensing animal in the world to perceive them.21 In Locke’s terms, 
in the bodies themselves, they are nothing but the “powers” to produce a sensation in 
us. What grounds these powers in the material realm cannot be anything other than 
primary (that is, real) qualities. Drawing on the philosophy of the “Corpuscularians,” 
Locke suggested that the real qualities directly responsible for our sensing of these sec-
ondary qualities are in fact the primary qualities of the minute invisible bodies acting 
upon our senses.
It may seem an odd fact that Newton felt the urge in the main text of the Opticks 
to introduce a definition of color that was, for many of his contemporaries, so tightly 
connected with philosophical conceptions and hypotheses. The theory of second-
ary qualities was in the earlymodern period a distinctive sequel to the corpuscular 
and mechanical hypothesis.22 The heuristic value and, so to speak, completeness of 
the mechanical philosophy depended on its ability to account for every process in 
the material world. This meant that the qualitative residue, the whatever-it-is that is 
not reducible to figure and movement, should be explained away, ascribed to another, 
incorporeal realm. This was precisely the function of secondary qualities. The oddity 
here is that Newton—as is well known—was not at all committed to the truth or com-
pleteness of mechanism. And even if he were, the first book of the Opticks, with its neat 
web of experiments and its claim for inductive certainty, was certainly not a hospitable 
place for such a speculative definition. Indeed, one of Newton’s eighteenth-century 
French translators, Jean-Paul Marat, probably felt that it was out of place, and shame-
lessly omitted it in his 1787 translation.23
But this is clearly wrong: Newton crucially needed the“philosophical definition.”He 
needed it not for the sake of defending any Lockean or Boylian view of primary quali-
ties and mechanical philosophy, but because of the conceptual challenge just men-
tioned. Newton needed a definition of color that allowed for the paradoxical assertion 
that colors are present in white light‘unseen.’ Color needed to be defined in a way that 
strips it of its phenomenal clothing. For this purpose, as will soon become clearer, the 
dispositional definition, which construes colors in the rays as powers to transmit a 
certain kind of movement to the brain, was framed.
21 Ibid.,xxxi.2): “there would yet be no more Light, or Heat in the World, than there would be 
Pain if there were no sensible Creature to feel it, though the Sun should continue just as it is now, 
and Mount Aetna flame higher than ever it did.”
22 For a presentation of the philosophical core of the doctrine of secondary qualities, and a 
discussion of its main justifications in seventeenth-century philosophical thought, see Hamou 
(2011).
23 See Newton (1989).
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3.2.2 The Comb Experiment and the Physiological 
Threshold for Color Sensation
In proposition 4, Newton had stated that the mingling of different spectral rays pro-
duces new colors. These colors, although sometimes indiscernible from the homo-
geneal, prismatic ones, should be described as “heterogeneal,” since their composite 
character in regard to refraction is manifested when they are viewed through a prism. 
Experiments in proposition 5 show that a recombined “white” light is also obtained 
through the mingling of several colored rays—the recombination occurs for example 
when the colored lights produced by the prismilluminate a piece of paper held at a 
certain distance from the beam: if duly positioned, the paper appears white, not tainted 
with any of the colors of the spectrum from which it receives its light. In the next set 
of experiments the refracted beam is made to converge into one white spot on a paper 
at the focus of a lens. One variant of this experiment is of crucial interest, because it is 
clearly devised to show that the new “composite” white is not the result of an alteration 
of the various colored rays—an alteration which would result from the mixing of the 
rays on the paper—but their mere superposition or concatenation, each keeping its 
color, or rather its colorific quality, exactly as it was before the blending. In this experi-
ment, a large comb with oversized teeth is inserted into the beam of light between a 
prism that has dispersed that beam into colors and a lens that recombines it into white 
on a paper at its focus.
The comb allows the experimenter to block certain colors of the spectrum, and 
the immediate effectis that the recombined white disappears and “degenerates” into 
a given color. The reason whereof, is that the suppression of some colors by the teeth 
of the comb makes the composition of the resulting light different, and accordingly 
produces heterogeneous colors instead of white. A slow movement of the comb makes 
the composite resulting color change and causes a “perpetual succession of colors”on 
the paper. However, when the movement of the comb is quicker, this effect changes 
dramatically:
But if I  so much accelerated the Motion, that the Colours by reason of their 
quick Succession could not be distinguished from one another, the Appearance 
of the single Colours ceased. There was no red, no yellow, no green, no blue, nor 
purple to be seen any longer, but from a Confusion of them all there arose one 
uniform white Colour.24
The experiment is beautifully devised. It clearly shows that the white obtained here 
cannot possibly be the result of an alteration of the qualities of the rays that are 
24 Newton (1979, p. 140).
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Mon Feb 10 2014, NEWGEN
acprof-9780199337095.indd   76 2/10/2014   7:52:19 PM
77 Vision, Color Innateness, and Method in Newton’s Opticks
mingled. As a matter of fact, there cannot be any causal action of the rays on one 
another because in this special case the variously colored rays do not reach the paper 
at the same time but only successively. In a letter to Robert Hooke, explaining for the 
first time the same kind of experiment, Newton made this point very clearly, insisting 
on the impossibility of any causal interaction between physicallydiscrete events that 
occur at different times:
and that this whiteness is produce onely by a successive intermixture of the 
colours without their being assimilated or reduced to any uniformity, is cer-
tainly beyond all possibility of doubting unlesse things that exist not at the same 
time may notwithstanding act on one another.25
Once it is understood that the various colors in succession cannot really interact on the 
paper, the white appearance remains all the more perplexing. How are we to account 
for it? To Newton, no doubt the final answer is a psycho-physiological one: white is 
to be understood as a mental effect of the successive inputs of the colored rays on the 
retina and the part of the brain where these inputs are conveyed (a part thatNewton 
calls the sensorium).
By the Quickness of the Successions, the Impressions of the several Colours 
are confounded in the Sensorium, and out of that Confusion ariseth a mix’d 
Sensation. If a burning Coal be nimbly moved round in a Circle with Gyration 
continually repeated, the whole circle will appear like fire. The reason of which 
is, that the Sensation of the Coal in the several places of that Circle remains 
impress’d on the Sensorium, until the Coal return again to the same place.26
The rotating burning coal is provided as an example for the existence of a physiological 
threshold, a time lapse, under which two successive appearances are no longer per-
ceived as distinct. The coalescence of colors into white is not in the first instance a 
physical phenomenon, because it is not properly the light rays that are mixed, but 
the impressions they are making on our sensorium, impressions that, for some physi-
ological reason, cannot be perceived distinctly, and therefore result in a sensation of 
whiteness. It should be clear that the comb experiment is not in itself a demonstration 
that white (solar) light is actually composed of distinct immutable colored rays, but it is 
clearly a demonstration that white light can be so composed. The experiment provides 
25 Newton (1959–1977, vol. 1, p. 182–183). This letter, dated 1672, describes an equivalent of the 
comb experiment, where the spectrum is intercepted by a rotating toothed wheel.
26 Newton (1979, p. 141).
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an explanatory model: it indicates a possible way out of the phenomenological puzzle 
of color innateness—the fact that colors cannot be seen in white light is no longer 
an objection to ‘unseen’ presence, since we are now in a position to show, through 
an ingenious experiment, that a white appearance can be produced by the successive 
effects of discrete color rays on the sense organs. In the comb experiment, no one ray 
can properly be said to be “white,” or whitemaking, but what we see on the paper is 
nevertheless clearly whiteness. The white-making property belongs to the whole set of 
successive rays, each endowed with a specific colorific property.
Through the comb experiment, we also understand more fully the need for a dis-
positional definition of color. The definition says: what allows us to say that a ray is col-
ored in a philosophical senseis not a form or an appearance of the ray, but its ability or 
dispositionto propagate a certain motion to the sensorium. When the rays are blended 
(as they are in heterogeneous lights), the sensation changes, butthe ability of each ray 
to propagate motion is not really affected. Each ray keeps its own movement, that is, 
its own colorific property, although the composition of movements in the brain pro-
duces there a sensation thatnecessarily differs from the one each ray separately would 
produce.
To sum up, I argue that the comb experiment is a turning point in Newton’s dem-
onstration of color innateness, because it helps to make sense of the conceptual puzzle 
of color mutability and immutability. I also argue that in order to understand the full 
implications of this experiment, the reader has to be apprised of a general framework 
of philosophical ideas on color perception supposed by Newton. The dispositional 
definition of color together with the suggestion of a physiological threshold for color 
perception are the main constituents of this framework.
Newton was certainly aware that the “physiological” explanation (the “mixing” of 
impressions in the sensorium), as it stands in the main text of the Opticks, is rather 
sketchy, not to say sibylline. In the Queries, he offers a certain number of elements that 
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Figure 3.1 Comb Experiment
Source: Opticks, Book I, Part 2, exp. 10. Reproduced by permission of the Newton Project.
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allow this explanation to be somewhat fleshed out. Here is my own reconstruction of 
this explanation:
1) Query 15:  The images (“species”) of objects figured at the back of both eyes are 
united into one single image in the brain through the pairing and junction of the 
individual fibers contained in the optical nerves. It is there, and only there that it 
stirs up sensations. This place in the brain is what Newton calls the “sensorium.”27
2) Query 16: A pressure of the finger, or a stroke on the eye makes some colored phan-
tasm appear, and this appearance lasts for about one second. A coal of fire moved 
rapidly in the circumference of a circle appears as a continuous circle. These phe-
nomena indicate that the movements that go through the nerves and reach the 
sensorium are of a lasting nature.
3) Query 17: This, in turn, suggests that these movements are vibrations rather than 
pressures or a translation of solid particles. Rays of light striking on the back of the 
eye may excite vibrations propagated in the solid fibers of the optical nerve (Query 
12) up to the common sensorium, where the final image is formed.
4) Query 23: A vehicle for these vibrations may be the very aetherial medium “much sub-
tiler than air” that (Newton suspects) fills every empty space in the world, accounting 
for the transmission of heat in a vacuum, for fits of easy transmission, for magnetism, 
or for attraction. This medium probably pervades the “solid pellucid and uniform cap-
illamenta,” that is, some transparent substance, filling the inside of the fibers.28
5) Query 13:  Variety in the “bigness” of vibrations determines variety in color 
perception.
6) When several rays of different colors strike the back of the eye in a time less than 
one second in duration, the vibrating motions made in the pellucid liquor of the 
27 The definition of ‘sensorium,’ and the characterization of space as tanquam sensorium dei 
(Query 31), will become important bones of contention in the Leibniz-Clarke controversy. 
Leibniz mentioned Goclenius’ Philosophical Lexicon, where ‘sensorium’ is defined as ‘organ of 
sense.’ But Newton’s usage of the term is clearly related to Henry More’s, and should be under-
stood as a brief form for “common sensorium”:  in The Cambridge Notebook under the entry 
“sensation” (fol. 33, 104 r; McGuire and Tamny 1983, p. 382). Newton, drawing on the heads 
established by More in his fourth chapter of The Immortality of the Soul, lists the principal com-
peting conceptions of the seat of common sense, or “sensorium”: 1) the whole body, 2) the stom-
ach, 3) the heart (Hobbes), 4) the brain, 5) the membranes 6) the septum lucidum, 7) a perfectly 
solid part of the body, 8) the conarion, 9) the fourth ventricle of the brain where the spinal nar-
row meets the nerves (More), and 10) the animal spirits in the fourth ventricle.
28 Query 23, specifically devoted to vision, is inserted in a set of new queries in the second 
English edition of 1717, where Newton speculates on the role of an aether, rarer than air, but 
more elastic and more active, apt to explain attraction, refraction and reflection of light, fits 
of transmission, and finally the nervous transmission of motive action and sensation. On this 
important addition, see Guerlac (1967).
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Mon Feb 10 2014, NEWGEN
acprof-9780199337095.indd   79 2/10/2014   7:52:19 PM
80 The Roots of Newton's Experimental Method
optical filaments will blend together before arriving to the sensorium. The resulting 
effect will be the production of a sensation different from the one each color sepa-
rately would have produced.
7) White is the resulting sensation of the mixing/confusing of a large number of vibra-
tions of various sizes. These waves arrive to the sensorium either successively but 
in rapid succession (in the case of the comb experiment), or simultaneously (in the 
ordinary experience of solar light).
Premises 1 to 5 are drawn almost verbatim from the Queries. Premises 6 and 7 are 
needed in order to account for the comb experiment on the basis of 1–5. They allow us 
to make sense of what Newton says in Book I, the second part, prop V: that white is a 
“mix’d sensation” arising from the confusion in the sensorium of the impression made 
by several colors.
Although the complete argument on vision that we tried to reconstruct here is com-
posed of disconnected pieces thatthe Queries introduce in a seemingly non-committal 
way, it is quite obvious that it stems from a coherent, non-trivial theory—a theory that-
appears to covera large range of questions commonly debated in seventeenth-century 
discussions of vision, as for example, the merging of retinal images in the brain, the 
location and nature of the sensorium, the mechanism of transmission in the nerves, or 
the nature of psychological awareness as it results from sensory affections. However, 
the Queries are not the best place in which to get the clearest picture of this theory. One 
remarkable fact about Newton’s theory of vision is that it is worked out, almost fully, 
at an early stage in his career, probably even before the time he began to experiment 
with prisms, and certainly before he reached his mature doctrine of light and colors. 
Since the literature has been rather silenton this aspect of Newtonian science,29it may 
be worth giving a brief account here of the theory and the context in which it was 
originally devised, before drawing our conclusions about its relationship to the general 
argument of Book I of the Opticks.
3.3 NEWTON’S EARLY RESEARCHES ON VISION
Several notes of the Cambridge Notebook of 1661–1665are concerned with visual sen-
sations and sensory faculties. Some of them are accounts of psycho-physical experi-
ments and observations, while others, of a more theoretical nature, testify to Newton’s 
extensive reading on a broad range of contemporary texts on vision, from Kepler and 
Descartes, to Hobbes, Walter Charleton, and Henry More. The 1666 manuscript “Of 
Colours” (Newton, ms. “b”) contains a description of an anatomical dissection of the 
29 With a few exceptions, among them notably Stein (2004).
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visual system of a mammal, with an illustration representing the merging of the retinal 
filaments at the optical chiasma.30 These texts (and illustrations) clearly show that the 
young Newton, like many of his contemporaries, approached the question of vision 
from within a general framework or paradigmatic account that I shall call for conve-
nience’s sake the ‘Cartesian paradigm’ (although it certainly owes as much to Kepler 
as it does to Descartes). According to this paradigm,the visual process must be under-
stood as a multistep process, which consists in a progressive ‘disfiguration’ of the visual 
image and in its transformation into physical events in the brain apt to stir up appro-
priate mental reactions. The Keplerian account of the formation of the retinal image 
shows that the eye works as a camera obscura. The image produced in the eye is not a 
simulacrum detached from the object, but a mere physical effect of light rays imping-
ing on the back of the eye. Some mechanistic account of brain and nerve, involving 
the action of subtle bodies or animal spirits, is required to explain the transmission 
30 Newton does not say who is performed the dissection, and what animal is dissected. Perhaps 
Newton was already at this time in contact with William Briggs (1642–1704), who was a fellow 
of Corpus Christi College Cambridge. Briggs trained as a physicist, and wrote several texts on 
the anatomy of the eye. He corresponded on the topic with Newton. In a letter to Briggs of April 
25, 1685, which Newton wrote as a dedicatory epistle for Briggs’ Nova theoriavisionis (Briggs 
1685), Newton mentions that he had once attended a dissection performed by Briggs, and he 
highly praises the latter’s skill: “Your skill and artistry in its dissection once, I remember, afforded 
me no small enjoyment. You neatly displayed the motor muscles in their natural positions and 
so disposed all the other tissues before us, that we could not so much understand as perceive the 
functions and services of each, with the result that there is no refinement that I have not long 
expected of your knife” (Newton 1959–1977, vol. 3, p. 418).
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Figure 3.2 Binocular Vision in “Of Colours”
Source: Add. Ms. 3975, Cambridge University Library. Reproduced by permission of the Newton Project (Newton 
ms. b, p. 17).
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of motion from the external organs (the eyes) down to a central organ, the seat of the 
“common sense.” Finally, a dualistic account of human sensation is needed in order to 
understand how a material event, or chain of movements ending in the brain, can be 
connected to a visual idea or mental awareness. The connection is usually considered 
arbitrary, attributed to the will of the Creator who has “instituted”that such or such 
motion in the brain make the soul have such or such an idea.
One needs to distinguish between these basic tenetsand theinterpretationsthat 
they allowed for vis-à-vis different physiological and/or philosophical hypotheses. It 
seems clear to me that Newton’s research in the early manuscripts aimed at construct-
ing an interpretation of the Cartesian paradigm that on many points takes issue with 
Descartes’way of fleshing out the paradigm. Three main issues are tackled in the 1665–
1666 manuscripts: binocular vision, the mechanism of nervous transmission, and the 
relation between visual representation and cerebral images.The three topics need to be 
reviewed here because, quite surprisingly, each of themhad an important part to play 
in the final explanation of color innateness.
3.3.1 Binocular Vision
The question of whether we see with both eyes or with only one eye at a time had 
been long debated. Alhazen and Witelo maintained the fusion of images coming from 
both eyes. Descartes was also of this opinion, and thought that the merging of the 
images from both eyes takes place at the surface of the pineal gland. This view was 
challenged by Gassendi and his followers. According to Charleton’sPhysiologia, one 
sees (distinctly) with only one eye at a time, through which the soul preferentially 
directs the flux of animal spirits.31 Henry More offers another option:  to make our 
vision distinct, the retinal images are indeed united, but not in the brainor in any other 
part of the body. One should think of them as united in the outside world, on the object 
itself, with the soul, according to More, being able to sense the converging path of the 
external rays connecting the object seen to the eyes.32 Newton, who quotes Charleton 
31 See Charleton (1654, ch. 3, p. 166, art. 22):  “that all men see (distinctly) but with one Eye 
at once.”
32 See More (1659, ch.10). More rejects the Cartesian idea that an image is “corporeally produced 
in the inside of the brain,” on the basis that “colours and figures would be strangely depraved if 
not quite obliterated” if they were to be seen in the opaque substance of the brain. He contends 
that the soul is not strictly confined to the sensorium, but has the power to reach the back of the 
eyes through visual spirits, and there to directly perceive the retinal images, with their proper 
colors. The idea that the immediate object of the sight should be the retinal pictures themselves, 
since they faithfully conserve the colors and figures of the external objects, is completely at odds 
with Descartes’ explanation of vision—it misses the very point of Descartes’ rejection of inten-
tional species, namely, that we do not need resemblance and colored images in order to perceive.
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and More in his Cambridge Manuscripts, does not follow them in their departure from 
Cartesian orthodoxy. He maintains the idea that the ultimate cause of our perception 
is some sort of “motional picture,” produced, not in the camera obscura of the eye, 
but well inside the brain, where the two optical nerves converge again after their first 
crossing. Experimental justifications are offered for this ‘cerebralist’ thesis: on the one 
hand, the anatomical dissection already mentioned allows Newton to follow the path 
of nervous transmission from each point of the retina to each point of the sensorium, 
arguing that a one-to-one pairing of the filaments of both eyes occurs in the chiasma, 
connecting to the same spot in the brain the two corresponding points on the retinas 
that share the same spatial position within the eye. Here is how Newton describes it:
Now I conceive that every point in the retina of one eye hath its correspondent 
point in the other, from which two very slender pipes filled with a most lympid 
liquor doe without either interuption or any other uneavenesse or irregularity 
in their processe, goe along the optick nervesto the juncture EFGH where they 
meeteeither twixt GFor FH, & there unite into one pipe as big as bothe of them, 
& so continue in one passing either twixt IL or MK into the braine where they 
are terminated perhaps at the next meeting of the nerves twixt the Cerebrum & 
cerebellum, in the same order that their extemities were scituate in the Retinals.33
One should note that the description is not entirely derived from observation. As Newton 
acknowledges, the distinction of the various optical filaments, still perceptible by touch 
before the chiasma, is no longer apparent behind it—so the pairing of the corresponding 
points on both eyes, although suggested by the form of the chiasma, is no more than a 
physiological hypothesis. The main argument for its truth is not anatomy, but rather the 
fact that a physiology of this sort would account for a number of psycho-physical obser-
vations. Newton presents these observations just after the anatomical description. He 
mentions first the basic fact that in visual experience we see with both eyes, but perceive 
only one image. This suggests that some fusion takes place. Then, if one eye is pressed 
laterally with some protruding object, we tend to see double, and this is easily explained 
if we understand that, because of the slight deformation of the retina, the same distinct 
point of an object projected on both eyes is no longer pictured by a couple of homolo-
gous filaments. Again, when objects are seen very close up, they often appear double, 
33 Newton (ms. b, p. 17). Newton’s description is close enough to the contemporary one: it gives 
an adequate-enough account of how the axons of the optical nerve are distributed. The fusion 
however does not takes place in the chiasma, as Newton thought, but directly in the cerebral 
cortex cells, and in such a way that a discrimination of the information from each eye is still 
possible. Such discrimination is the neurological basis of the stereoscopic effect, which entirely 
eluded Newton.
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because in this situation the distance between the eyes creates a sensible discrepancy of 
the retinal images. Newton adds an interesting suggestion: if one could make a blue color 
and a yellow one strike the left and right retina respectively on homologous filaments at 
the same time, the resulting image would certainly be green. Although it is very improb-
able that Newton succeeded in realizing this psychological blending of color, the opinion 
expressed here is very suggestive of his later thoughts on production of a heterogeneous 
color, or white, as the result of a “mix’d impression.”34
To sum up this first point: Newton’s opinion on the fusion of retinal images clearly 
shows his adoption of a Cartesian-like, cerebralist theory of vision:  the end term of 
the visual process is not the retinal image (as in the Gassendist tradition), but some 
“picture” in the brain, constructed out of retinal information—a picture that could no 
longer be defined as luminous or colored. The only properties of retinal images that 
can conceivably be transmitted in the entirely opaque space of the brain are indeed 
figures and movements. Although it has not often been acknowledged, adherence 
to a cerebralist account of visual perception, such as the one offered by Newton or 
Descartes, was itself a strong motive for holding a dispositional theory of light and 
color, quite independentlyof the “mechanistic” justification of the distinction between 
primary and secondary qualities. Light and colors cannot be transmitted as such into 
the sensorium, and yet a cerebralist doctrine of sense perception requires that they are 
nevertheless perceived there, in a completely opaque substance. Thus, they cannot be 
‘real’ qualities but only dispositional properties or powers (grounded on figures and 
motions) to stir up certain sensory ideas.
3.3.2 The mechanism of nervous 
transmission: The vibratory model
In Dioptrique IV, Descartesoffered a mechanistic account of sensory transmission 
in the nerves, which paralleled his explanation of light transmission in the second 
34 See Newton (ms. b, p.  18):  “Why a blew seen by one eye and a yellow by the other at the 
same time produces a green unless the fantasy makes one colourpraedominant.” The role given 
here to ‘phancy’ or ‘fantasy’ is noteworthy: in the Cambridge Notebook, Newton had noted (see 
Newton ms. a, 125r, 130r) that the very same sensation can be either physically produced or 
simply fancied, and this fact serves here as an auxiliary clause which provides an easy escape 
when the observation does not fit the prediction of the ‘cerebralist’ theory. The role of ‘fantasy’ in 
vision and binocularity will be stressed again twenty-fiveyears later, in a long letter to John Locke 
(June 30, 1691; Newton 1659–1677, vol. 3, p. 152–153) reporting dangerous experiments on after 
images: the impression produced on one eye by a direct contemplation of the sun will degenerate 
into colored circles and finally vanish, but for quite a long time it can be reactivated at will, not 
only in the eye affected but also, more surprisingly, in the other one. Newton ascribes this strange 
phenomenon to the action of the imagination: “the man’s phansy probably concurred with the 
action of the sun to produce that phantasm of the sun . . . .”
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element.35 In both cases, a certain tendency to movement is instantly transmitted 
through a perfectly dense and rigid medium, similar to a stick. The stick analogy, 
however, does not apply very well to soft cerebral parts, such as optical nerves; and 
Descartes had to explain, in a rather ad hoc manner, that in living organisms, a cur-
rent of animal spirits propagated into the nerves acts as a sort of tensor of the internal 
substance, allowing the transmission of the “pressure” of light. Newton did not follow 
Descartes in this rather contrived explanation. His own understanding of light trans-
mission put him in mind of another model of nervous transmission. In “Of Colours,” 
he describes the resulting effects of the impact of light rays on the retina in these terms:
Lightseldom striks upon the parts of grossebodys (as may bee seen in its pass-
ingthrough them), its reflection & refraction is made by the diversity of æthers, 
& therefore its effect on the Retina can only bee to make this vibrate which 
motion then must bee either carried in the optick nerve to the sensorium or 
produce other motions that are carried thither.36
The passage contains a clear hint at an atomistic conception of light and bodies: both are 
constituted out of small corpuscles disseminated into large empty spaces. This explains 
why light “seldom strikes” the parts of (gross) bodies—it usually passes through them 
into the ‘diversities of aethers’ filling the empty spaces left inside these bodies. The kind 
of movement transmitted to the aetherby the impact of light rays is not described as 
a pressure, but as a vibration whose effect may be compared to the concentric waves 
produced when a stone strikes the smooth surface of water.The vehicle for this sensory 
wave is conceived as a “pure transparent liquor” contained in the tube-like structure 
of the nervous filaments. These filaments behave like “trunks” filled with a homoge-
neous substance like air thattransmits sound along their length with almost no dissipa-
tion. Newton’s attention to psycho-physiological phenomena, like rotating the burning 
coals, and after-images is also congruent with a physical interpretation in terms of 
vibrations, since it suggests that the visual phantasms produced by the action of light 
on the retina do not immediately vanish but endure for a certain time.
Newton retained this vibratory model of nervous transmission. Before the publica-
tion of the Opticks, he went back to it on various occasions and added some refine-
ments. First, in his Hypothesis of Light (1675), he suggested the existence of a fixed 
correlation between “bigness of vibrations” and colors similar to the correlation 
between tonality and length of sound waves. The most vivid colors (the reds and yel-
lows) should be caused by the biggest pulses, and the darkest ones (blues and purples) 
35 See Descartes (1964–1976, vol. 7, p. 109–112).
36 Newton (ms. b, p. 19–20).
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by the smallest.37 This musical analogy was very important to Newton and, since the 
time of the Lectionesopticae, it convinced him of the existence of a certain “harmony” 
of colors, similar to the harmony of sounds. Newton even speculated that the seven 
colors of the spectrum might divide its length, as the successive chords (tone, third, 
fourth, fifth) do on the strings of an instrument.38A second important locus for under-
standing the exact scope of Newton’s vibratory model is Newton’s 1682 correspon-
dence with William Briggs. Briggs, in his New Theory(1685) was also interested in 
the musical analogy, but applied it almost literally: he contended that in visual sensa-
tion, the two optical nerves act like musical instruments, or vibrating lyres, each fila-
ment of the nerve being like a string, whose consonance with the corresponding one 
in the other eye was supposed to explain the mental uniting of the two retinal images. 
Newton strongly disagreed, arguing that unisons cannot possibly be the cause of a 
perceived unity of situation, this not even being the case for sounds: “the situation of 
sounds depends not on their tone.”39 As for ‘visible objects,’ another principle is needed 
to account for the fact that, with both eyes, we see them situated at one and the same 
place. This principle is clearly the aforementioned cerebralist analysis, according to 
which “the two motional pictures in the sensorium come together and become coinci-
dent.”40 So Newton is keen to distinguish on the one hand the physiological principle 
governing the formation of cerebral images (which strictly depends on the location 
and distributions of the small filaments connecting the retinas to a certain location in 
37 In these texts, the vibration size seems to be related to the mass of light corpuscles, rather than 
their speed. Newton however never tried to apply this “mass model” to the physical explana-
tion of color dispersion. In a brilliant paper, Bechler (1973) has shown that a mass model for 
color dispersion was somewhat unsatisfactory to Newton on account of its “abnormality” (it 
would require that another dynamic prevailed at the microscopic level of the light corpuscles, 
which cannot be accounted for in terms of attractive or repulsive forces). A  model discrimi-
nating color rays according to their speed would have been much more appealing to Newton 
because it would have allowed a physical explanation of refraction in terms of attractive or repul-
sive forces acting on the separating surface of the mediums, an explanation that would fit the 
physico-mathematical description given in the Principia, showing that the trajectory of the cor-
puscles crossing such surface would be more or less ‘refracted,’ according to their speed (but not 
their mass) (see Principia, Book I, section 14, prop. 94–96). Unfortunately Newton could not 
follow this: realizing that the ‘speed model’ would be corroborated if the last light coming from 
Jupiter’s satellites before their disappearence behind the planet was red, and the first light seen 
at their exit blue, he asked Flamsteed, the Greenwich astronomer, to tell him whether such a 
difference in color was observable. The negative answer seems to have ruined Newton’s hopes of 
explaining refraction in terms of attractive forces.
38 See An Hypothesis of Light, in a Letter to Henry Oldenburg, December 7, 1675, Newton (1959–
1977, vol. 1, pp. 362–383). See also Opticks, Book I, section 2, prop. 3 (1979, pp. 125–128) and 
Query 14 (p. 346).
39 Newton (1959–1977, vol. 2, letter 264;September 12, 1682, p. 383).
40 Ibid., p. 384.
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the brain); and on the other hand, the physiological principle governing the produc-
tion of color sensation, that is, a vibratory motion propagated into these filaments. 
The various lengths of the pulse determine various color sensations. The aesthetic fact 
that certain associations of colors are pleasing can be understood along the lines of the 
musical analogy, the soul being able to sense certain exact ratios in the said lengths. 
Confused or composed color sensation is produced when several trains of waves with 
differing lengths are superposed—white being the resulting effect of a cacophonic 
superposition, in which the composing lengths are no longer distinguishable.
3.3.3 Visual representation and cerebral 
images: Newton’s indirect realism
The last stage of the visual process is the one through which ‘motional pictures’ in the 
brain cause our ideas of visible objects, clad with colors and situated in the external 
world. Newton commented less on thisthan on other aspects of the Cartesian legacy. 
However a passage of the Cambridge Notebook, placed under the heading “of the soule,” 
offers a clear hint of how Newton understood the status of our mental representation of 
visible objects:
Quaere. 1 Why Objects appeare not inverst, Resp: The mind or Soule cannot 
judge the image in the Braine to be inversed unlesseshee perceived externall 
things with which shee might compare that Image.
2. Why doe appeare to bee without our body?Resp:  Becausein the image of 
things delineated in the braine by sight, the bodys image is placed in the midst 
of the images of other things, is moved at our command {towars} & from those 
other images [etc.]:
3. But why are not these objects then judged to bee in the braineResp: Because 
the image of the braine is not painted there, nor is the Braine perceived by the 
soule it not being in motion, & probably the soule perceives noebodys but by 
the helpe of their motion. But were the Braine perceived together with those 
images in it wee should thinke wee saw a body like the braineencompasing& 
comprehending our selves the starrs& all other visible objects[etc].41
What emerges from this set of questions and responses is a typically “representation-
alist,” or indirect realistdoctrine of visual representation. Here the departure from 
Descartes is noticeable. Although Descartes seems sometimes to suggest that the mind 
“inspects” the images in the brain, his usual position in the Dioptrique and elsewhere is 
41 Newton (ms. a, “Of the Soule,” p. 130v.).
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that cerebral images are not properly seen in the brain.42 Just as material signs, written 
in a familiar language, may convey their meaning without themselves being objects of 
awareness (so that the reader cannot even tell afterward in which language they were 
written),43 cerebral signs act on the mind and excite ideas without being themselves 
seen or represented to consciousness. Newton’s conception seems somewhat cruder 
if not naïve:44 to him, the cerebralist analysis entails that whatever is perceived visu-
ally is actually perceived in the brain—it is only indirectly, through inference, that the 
objects are judged to be outside the brain, located in external space. The last remark in 
Newton’s answer to the last question is especially telling on this score: if we could see 
the background of our visual images, every visible scene would appear as surrounded 
by the very substance of the brain! With such conceptions, Newton can easily dispose 
of the old question of inverted retinal (or cerebral) images: inversion is not an issue 
because we never perceive the external objects where they are, and we do not compare 
our images with them. Our only business is with what happens inside the head. Our 
sense of what is in the top part or bottom part in our visual field does not come from 
any independent, inner compass—it comes from directional clues thatbelong to the 
image itself (as, for example, the way the image changes when we raise the head, or the 
place in the image where the ground or the sky are represented). The fact that external 
objects appear to be outside the body and not in the head (see the second question) 
may be explained along the same lines: here again the true situation of the objects is 
not perceived, but judged from internal clues, and especially from the visual represen-
tation that one can have of his own body, which is perceived to be “in the midst of the 
images of other things,” and not all around them.
As we said, Newton’s approach may be labeled indirect realism: the direct object of 
perception is not and cannot in any sense be the external object itself. It is some sort 
of physical avatar, a picture hung in a gallery inside the brain. The mind perceives in 
being vitally united and present to this part of the brain where the images of things 
are transmitted. Newton never felt the need to give any justification for this view. 
It seems rather that it was for him a most natural consequence of the mechanistic, 
modern analysis of the senses. In fact this sort of indirect realism was rather common 
in England, and can also be found in Robert Hooke and probably in Locke—at least 
this view is a plausible way to make sense of the theory according to which we per-
ceive through “ideas” that are “in the mind.” The prevalence of this view in England 
42 On this ambiguity in Descartes, see Hatfield (1992).
43 See Descartes (1964–1977, vol.11, p. 4).
44 Tamny judges Newton’s version of the representative theory of perception as somewhat 
naïve;see Tamny(1979), McGuire and Tamny(1983), p. 232. Whatever its “naivety,” the idea that we 
inspect “images in our brain” is still commonly held today, especially among neurophysiologists.
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is also attested a contrario by the attacks that John Norris, the British Malebranchist, 
mounted against Locke, and all the authors whom he sarcastically named “the opti-
cal men,” on account of their gross, materialistic understanding of ideas as material 
images in the brain.45
I shall add one last word on the Newtonian understanding of human visual repre-
sentation. In the Queries of the Opticks, one famous passage offers a clear confirmation 
that he still held to his early 1665 conceptions even at the end of his career. Here is how 
Newton introduces the much-discussed idea that space may be understood as, so to 
speak, God’s sensorium. God, a powerful ever-living Agent . . . 
being in all Places, is more able by his Will to move the Bodies within his 
boundless uniform Sensorium, and thereby to form and reform the Parts of the 
Universe, than we are by our Will to move the Parts of our own Bodies. And 
yet we are not to Consider the World as the Body of God, or the several Parts 
thereof, as the Parts of God, He is an uniform Being, void of Organs, Members 
or Parts, and they are his Creatures subordinate to him, and subservient to his 
Will; and he is no more the Soul of them, than the Soul of Man is the Soul of 
the Species of Things carried through the Organs of Sense into the place of its 
Sensation, where it perceives them by means of its immediate Presence, without 
the Intervention of any third thing. The Organs of Sense are not for enabling the 
Soul to perceive the Species of Things in its Sensorium, but only for conveying 
them thither; and God has no need of such Organs, he being every where pres-
ent to the Things themselves.46
This famous text, besides expressing the metaphysical view that God exists and acts 
everywhere, also contains a rare, and rarely commented on47 explicit statement of 
Newton’s representationalist theory of perception:  external objects are not sensed 
where they are, they are not even sensed in the organs of sense—those latter being only 
media or vehicles for the transmission of the species (or images) of external objects. 
It is only those images that are sensed, through their immediate presence to the brain, 
or, more specifically, to the human sensorium—the soul’s dwelling place. So sensation 
occurs when the images are in a literal sense present to the soul. If the soul were able 
to extend its presence to the outer world, or be omnipresent, as God is, it would sense 
things directly, with no need of any organs. It seems clear that Newton is here relying 
45 See Norris (1701).
46 Newton (1979, Query 31).
47 With the notable exception of Tamny (1979).
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on what he thinks is a rather common account of how human perception works, in 
order to make sense, analogically, of God’s presence and action.
3.4 CONCLUSION
Newton elaborated a coherent and rather original theory of vision to which he 
remained faithful throughout his life. He devised it at an early stage of his career, draw-
ing on his readings of modern authors such as Kepler, Descartes, Hobbes, Charleton, 
and Henry More, discussing them and adding important elements of his own based 
on dissection and psycho-physical experiments. This theory of vision was elaborated 
prior to and independently of what would become the central focus of Newton’s optical 
researches—prismatic experiments and the theory of differential refraction of light. As 
far as method is concerned, the theory of vision and the doctrine of light are clearly at 
variance. Newton addresses the question of vision as his predecessors did, using the 
basics tenets of the corpuscular philosophy and mechanistic physiology, coming up 
with hypotheses on the inner constituents of nerves and brain, and drawing tacitly on 
a dualistic metaphysical conception of soul and body. Thus it cannot be a surprise that 
the theory should not easily fit into the inductive architecture of the Opticks, where 
experiments alone are admitted as a basis for demonstrations, and that it was relegated 
to the margins of the book, under the headings of the Queries. However, the theory of 
vision was an important ingredient in Newton’s conception of white light as a hetero-
geneous mixture of innately colored rays. It is implicated both at a psychological and at 
a logical level. First, the fact that Newton had, ready at hand, a theory of color percep-
tion allowing for the possibility of a “mix’d sensation,” must have been the reason why 
to him the composite nature of white solar light was not the utter paradox that it was 
for others, and why it could present itself as a plausible solution to the problem of spec-
tral dispersion. Second, in the Lectionesopticae, his 1672 letter to Hooke, and later in 
the Opticks, Newton devised a set of “composition” experiments whose purpose was to 
make clearly apparent that we do in fact have “mix’d sensations” of colors, resulting in 
the perception of different kinds of apparently homogeneous colors, including white. 
In my view, these experiments constitute the backbone of Newton’s demonstration of 
the innateness of colors in white light. Moreover, as I have sought to show in the first 
part of this paper, their intelligibility requires considerable input from the theory of 
vision: basically it requires all the theory’s component parts—the account of nervous 
transmission in terms of vibrations, the cerebralist physiology of binocular vision, the 
dispositional theory of light and color, and finally the concept of the human sensorium 
and the brand of representational theory of perception thatit involves. When this is 
properly taken into account, it appears that those few Queries dealing with the theory 
of vision at the end of the volume are not quite what they are often taken to be. Far 
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from their being a mere hypothetical sequel of the demonstration—suggested by the 
experiments, but unnecessary for the demonstration itself—the queries in fact formu-
late the key argument, an argument only tacitly expressed in the main text, yet crucially 
needed in order to make the composition experiments serve their end: that is, to make 
the very concept of color innateness intelligible.
Newton has often been taken to task by recent commentators for his somewhat 
“rhetorical” inductivism.48 It has not been my aim here to join this battle. I have how-
ever wanted to stress the fact that Newtonian ‘empiricism,’ if it means anything at all, 
cannot mean that natural philosophy must be raised on a conceptual tabula rasa.You 
may be able to “evince” theories directly from phenomena, but you won’t make sense 
of them without a set of definitions, and without some axiom-like principles and back-
ground theories.49 I have tried to show in this paper that to make sense of Newton’s 
theory of light and color, a non-trivial theory of vision—of Cartesian pedigree, but 
with specific Newtonian ingredients—isneeded, and should be included among these 
quasi-axiomatic principles.
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